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ABSTRACT
In this paper we provide a basic introduction of the core
ideas and theories surrounding fault-tolerant quantum com-
putation. These concepts underly the theoretical frame-
work of large-scale quantum computation and communica-
tions and are the driving force for many recent experimental
efforts to construct small to medium sized arrays of con-
trollable quantum bits. We examine the basic principals
of redundant quantum encoding, required to protect quan-
tum bits from errors generated from both imprecise con-
trol and environmental interactions and then examine the
principals of fault-tolerance from largely a classical frame-
work. As quantum fault-tolerance essentially is avoiding the
uncontrollable cascade of errors caused by the interaction
of quantum-bits, these concepts can be directly mapped to
quantum information.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous;
D.2.8 [Software Engineering]: Metrics—complexity mea-
sures, performance measures
General Terms
Quantum Information, Quantum Error Correction
Keywords
ACM proceedings, LATEX, text tagging
1. INTRODUCTION
Fault-tolerant, error corrected, digital quantum computing
underpins a significant worldwide effort to construct viable,
commercial quantum computing systems [7]. The size of
such error corrected machines is somewhat daunting for a
field that has only managed to experimentally fabricate ar-
rays of up to about ten functional quantum-bits (qubits)
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[4, 3]. However, the theoretical framework for fault-tolerant
quantum computing has existed for nearly 20 years and is
very well understood and quantum computing is competing
with the vast classical computing power currently in exis-
tence. It would be unreasonable to believe (even given the
apparent computational power quantum information pro-
cessing has over classical computing), that a small, error
prone array of qubits could computationally outperform a
classical system comprising of potentially millions of com-
puting cores, each itself containing billions (or even trillions)
of transistors.
Fault-tolerant quantum computing refers to the framework
of ideas that allow qubits to be protected from quantum
errors introduced by poor control or environmental interac-
tions (Quantum Error Correction, QEC) and the appropri-
ate design of quantum circuits to implement both QEC and
encoded logic operations in a way to avoid these errors cas-
cading through quantum circuits [8]. By avoiding a cascade
of errors, there becomes a point (when the fundamental ac-
curacy of individual qubits is high enough), where QEC is
correcting more errors than are being created. Once this
threshold has been achieved, expanding the size of the pro-
tective quantum will exponentially decrease the failure of
the encoded information and allows us to achieve arbitrarily
long quantum algorithms implemented with noisy devices.
In this paper we will provide a basic introduction to some
of the key principals of QEC and then pivot into a discus-
sion about fault-tolerance that have been investigated in the
classical computing world. As the goal of fault-tolerance is
to prevent errors to cascade uncontrollably, a large amount
of classical work can be easily transferred to the quantum
world.
2. QUANTUM COMPUTING
In this section we present the basic mathematical framework
for qubits, quantum gate operations and quantum circuits.
Further details can be found in a number of papers [2] and
books [8] both from the physics community and the com-
puter science community.
Quantum circuits represent and manipulate information in
qubits. A single qubit has an associated quantum state |ψ〉 =
(α0, α1)
T = α0 |0〉 + α1 |1〉. Here, |0〉 = (1, 0)T and |1〉 =
(0, 1)T are quantum analogons of classical logic values 0 and
1, respectively. α0 and α1 are complex numbers called am-
plitudes with |α0|2 + |α1|2 = 1.
Quantum measurement is defined with respect to a basis
and yields one of the basis vectors with a probability re-
lated to the amplitudes of the quantum state. Common
measurements are known as Z- and X-measurements. Z-
measurement is defined with respect to basis (|0〉 , |1〉). Ap-
plying a Z-measurement to a qubit in state |ψ〉 = α0 |0〉 +
α1 |1〉 yields |0〉 with probability |α0|2 and |1〉 with prob-
ability |α1|2. Moreover, the state |ψ〉 collapses into the
measured state (i.e. only the components of |ψ〉 consistent
with the measurement result remains). X-measurement is
defined with respect to the basis (|+〉 , |−〉), where |±〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉).
A state may be modified by applying single-qubit quantum
gates. Each quantum gate corresponds to a complex unitary
matrix, and gate function is given by multiplying that ma-
trix with the quantum state. The application of X gate to a
state results in a bit flip: X(α0, α1)
T = (α1, α0)
T . The ap-
plication of the Z gate results in a phase flip: Z(α0, α1)
T =
(α0,−α1)T . A Y = iXZ gate can be thought of as both
a bit-flip and a phase-flip together on an individual qubit.
These three gates are important in the context of quantum
errors.
The exponentiation of the Pauli matrices results in the ro-
tational gates Rx, Ry , Rz parameterised by the angle of the
rotation [8]. Hence the bit flip is a rotation by π around
the X-axis, implying that X = Rx(π), and the phase-flip is
a rotation by π around the Z-axis, such that Z = Rz(π).
The Hadamard gate is H = Rz(π/2)Rx(π/2)Rz(π/2) and
can be used to take a computational state {ket0, |1〉} into
superposition states, {|±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2, a state with no
classical analogue
In the context of fault-tolerant quantum computation, only
one interaction gate is needed; the controlled-not (CNOT)
gate. The CNOT gate is the quantum analogue of a binary
XOR operation and is designed to bit-flip the state of a
target qubit, conditional on the state of a control qubit. This
gate can be employed on certain quantum states to prepare
entangled states. For example, CNOT(|0〉 + |1〉) |0〉 /√2 =
(|00〉 + |11〉)/√2. This state, known as a Bell state has
the property that measuring one of the qubits produces a
random result (|0〉 or |1〉 with a 50:50 probability), but once
the state of one qubit is measured, the state of the other
qubit is also determined.
It is well known that the ability to perform arbitrary rota-
tions around two orthogonal axis (e.g. Rz(θ1) and Rx(θ2)
for arbitrary {θ1, θ2}) and to couple arbitrary pairs of qubits
with a CNOT gate is sufficient to realise anyN-qubit unitary
operation. This gate set is therefore quantum universal.
3. ERRORS AND QUANTUM ERROR COR-
RECTING CODES
There are two important differences between classical error
correction and quantum error correction. The first is the
no-cloning theorem [11], which states that is is impossible
to perfectly copy an unknown quantum state. i.e. there is no
operation that satisfies U |ψ〉 |0〉 = |ψ〉 |ψ〉 for an unknown
|ψ〉. Therefore, we are unable to protect arbitrary quan-
tum states against errors by simply making multiple copies.
Secondly, any measurement of an arbitrary quantum state
will collapse the wavefunction describing the state. Hence
protecting errors in an encoded piece of quantum informa-
tion by measuring a certain subset of the encoded block will
irrevocably destroy the information content of that state.
Therefore we need a slightly new mechanism to protect en-
coded quantum information.
The foundation of quantum error correction is still based on
classical coding theory, however we need to design codes in
a slightly different manner. This is due both to the restric-
tions of what we can theoretically do with quantum infor-
mation, but also due to the possible errors that can affect
qubits. Unlike classical bits, which can only experience a flip
between |0〉 ↔ |1〉, qubits can also experience phase errors
(|0〉+ |1〉)/√2↔ (|0〉− |1〉)/√2. Additionally, errors do not
occur in a discrete manner. They are most often continuous
errors, such as a rotation around the X axis by some an-
gle ǫ or some incoherent (non-unitary) error caused by the
interaction with the outside environment.
Due to expedience we will only present the formalism for
coherent errors, those that can be represented by a uni-
tary gate. In this case, an error operator, E, acting on
a qubit, |ψ〉 can be decomposed into a linear superposi-
tion of X gates, Z gates and both Y = iXZ, E |ψ〉 =
a1 |ψ〉+a2X |ψ〉+a3Z |ψ〉+ia4XZ |ψ〉. If we could magically
measure if an X and/or Z error occurred on a qubits (via
some type of quantum measurement), the state would col-
lapse to the state {|ψ〉 , X |ψ〉 , Z |ψ〉 , XZ |ψ〉} with a prob-
ability of {|a1|2, |a2|2, |a3|2, |a4|2}. This converts a possible
continuous quantum error into a discrete X and/or Z gate.
While the errors themselves are continuous (for very small
errors, |a1|2 ≈ 1), this determination of what type of error
has occurred converts small errors into discrete bit- or phase-
errors with small amplitudes converted to small probabilities
for such results to be observed. The question is, how do we
detect if some type of discrete error has occurred?
This detection occurs through the idea of redundant encod-
ing with two classical codes. One is designed to detect X-
errors and one is designed to detect Z-errors without having
to, necessarily, decode the codespace. Detecting an error
indirectly for bit-flips is commonplace in classical computer
science and was usurped for the quantum regime. The sim-
plest example is the bit-flip code, with basis states given
by |0〉
L
= |0〉⊗N and |1〉 = |1〉⊗N , where the ⊗N notation
simply meaning N copies of the qubit. The basic idea is
that given a given codified, N , the number of physical flips
needed to turn |0〉
L
↔ |1〉
L
scales linearly with N . Again,
in the quantum regime, we are not allowed to directly mea-
sure any subset of qubits in the code block. So we need a
different method to identify errors. In the context of the bit
flip code, we notice a certain property, namely that for both
basis states, pairwise bit-parity in the code block is even (i.e.
calculating the parity of any two bits via modulo addition
for the |0〉
L
and |1〉
L
state is even). If such a comparison
ever results in an odd value, we know an error has occurred
without actually knowing if we started with the |0〉
L
or |1〉
L
state. This is what we need. Therefore, we need a way
to calculate the parity of any two qubits in the code block
without directly measuring the qubits themselves. We can
do this via the circuit in Fig. ??. This circuit introduces
an ancilla qubit that is initialised, interacted with a pair of
qubits in the code block and measured. The result of the
measurement on the ancilla (either |0〉 or |1〉) will determine
the parity of the two qubits (odd or even), and also force
these two qubits to be in an even or odd parity state if they
were not beforehand.
The principal of a codespace within quantum computation
is to construct encoded codewords that are always in cer-
tain, well defined parity states regardless of the state of
the encoded information. Physical errors will then perturb
encoded information away from these well defined parities
which can be detected without determining any information
regarding the encoding.
Returning back to the example of a redundancy code, the
two encoded states |0〉
L
and |1〉
L
are constructed to be even
parity states of any pairwise Z operators. i.e. applying
the operator ZiZj for any i,j ∈ N returns the same state,
ZiZj |0, 1〉L = |0, 1〉L. Bit flip errors result in states which
violate this condition. For example, a bit-flip on qubit one
of the encoded block will result in Z1Zj |0, 1〉L = − |0, 1〉L,
∀j. Hence if we measure the parity of any of these operators
and we find an odd result, we know that some type of error
has occurred. Determining a location for the error and how
many unique errors we can identify depends on the size of
the code block, N . The parity of pairwise checks of the
ZiZi+1 operator will allow us to uniquely locate individual
errors and the number of errors we can successfully correct
scales linearly with the number of qubits in the code block.
For N qubits, we are able to uniquely correct (N − 1)/2
errors.
This example illustrates how we handle bit-flip errors within
quantum information, what about phase errors? In quantum
information, phase-flip errors work exactly the same way as
bit-flip errors if we take our compuational states as |±〉 =
(|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. i.e. a Z-error will take |+〉 ↔ |−〉. Hence
if we used a redundancy code of the form |0〉
L
= |+〉⊗N
and |1〉
L
= |−〉⊗N and instead of checking the parity of
the ZiZi+1 operator, we check the parities of the XiXi+1
operator for i,∈ (N − 1), then everything works exactly
the same way. Therefore, a redundancy code either using
|0, 1〉 or |+,−〉 states will allow us to either protect encoded
information against X-errors or Z-errors. A full quantum
error correction code therefore combines two classical codes,
independently responsible for bit-errors and phase-errors.
The Shor code is the simplest example of this [9]. In the
Shor code we essentially have one redundancy code embed-
ded within another. The code encodes a single qubit of
information into nine physical qubits. The basis states are
given by,
|0〉
L
=
1
2
√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉)(|000〉 + |111〉)(|000〉 + |111〉)
|1〉
L
=
1
2
√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉)(|000〉 − |111〉)(|000〉 − |111〉)
(1)
We have three blocks of three qubits that effectively act as a
distance three redundancy code to correct bit flips in the way
that we described above. This allows us to correct a single
bit flip error in any one of the three blocks. In principal,
this code can correct for three bit-flip errors (provided each
error occurs in a separate block), however in general, as
two or more errors can occur in a single block the code is
described as only having the capacity for correcting a single
bit flip error. Phase errors are corrected via the three blocks
and comparing the parity of pairwise blocks. Again, the
code, in principal, can correct for more than one phase error
(provided errors occur in specific locations), but in general
only a single arbitrary error is deterministically correctable.
4. FAULT-TOLERANCE
The effectiveness of QEC depends on how we implement
quantum circuits to realise the correction code. As with
classical computing, interactions between qubits during the
execution of the circuit leads to the copying of errors. If
this happens in an uncontrolled manner, the QEC code is
overwhelmed and the computation will fail. Therefore, we
need to be very careful when designing circuits such that this
does not occur. While there is not often a direct compari-
son between classical and quantum information processing,
the principals of fault-tolerance in a classical framework is
easily transferable. We will therefore focus on some general
principals of fault-tolerance in the classical world which can
be mapped directly to quantum computing.
5. SHORT PARALLEL TO DISTRIBUTED
SYSTEMS
The need for fault-tolerance in quantum computing can be
introduced by drawing parallels with distributed systems.
The following insights do not extend classical distributed
systems to quantum ones [10], but propose the problem
of quantum fault-tolerance to be formulated without intro-
ducing quantum information and quantum computing. The
discussion will focus on processes and communication over
point-to-point links.
The distributed system is modelled as crash-stop [1], such
that the processes can crash and never return to live, there
is at least one fault detector module in the system and the
communication links are perfect (messages are not lost, du-
plicated or inserted by fault). Additionally, the distributed
system includes a fault corrector, which is informed by the
fault detectors about faults requiring correction.
The main target of fault-tolerance, as presented in these
sections, is to control the propagation of faults between pro-
cesses. The presentation will focus on describing the dis-
tributed system elements, and the way these interact, but
without delving into details about the liveness and safety
properties of the presented protocols.
5.1 The processes
A process holds an abstract object q and a black-box that
consists of a coin, two Boolean values and a real value τ .
The black-box is a model for the process faults. The Boolean
values b and p are the results of tossing the coin twice. The
value true indicates heads, and false stands for tails.
None of the processes is aware of the Boolean values in-
side the box. Furthermore, the processes do not control
the black-box and the coin toss. The coin toss is randomly
performed (with a probability τ ), meaning that none, a sin-
gle or both values are generated at undetermined execution
points of the process. Therefore, there may be none or mul-
tiple coin tosses during the lifetime of a process. In order to
simplify the modelling, the probability τ is equal for all the
processes, and process failures are not correlated.
The actual state of a process is computed by the function
qa = q+ b+ p, where the + operation is the addition of the
two possible random faults modelled as Boolean values A
correct process is the one for which qa = q, while, if qa 6= q,
the process is called faulty. In the following, q will refer both
to the object and to its state, depending on the context it is
used in. It should be noted that object q is noncopyable1,
meaning that once constructed, it can be either transformed
locally or through distributed computations, but cannot be
copied between processes.
During process initialisation it possible to initialise the black-
box values and to set the state of q to a state chosen from a
discrete set sq ∈ S. Once the black-box was set up, there is
no guarantee that the values had not been changed by the
coin tosses.
A terminating process returns a state so ∈ S. During ter-
mination, the current q is classified against all the S-states,
and the closest so is returned. The classification is proba-
bilistic, meaning that if there is no state so for which so = q,
then it could happen that the returned state so is actually
orthogonal to the state so′ that was classified as next to q.
Once a process is terminated, it cannot be brought back to
live and, if one would like to approximate the probability of
q being in any of the states of S, the complete distributed
computation has to be repeated. More flexible initialisation
and termination procedures could benefit from a larger set
S, but this will negatively impact the practicality of system
implementation.
5.2 Communication and operations
The Boolean black-box values of a process can be either
read and communicated to other processes, or updated by
a second process. A single process is not able to read its
values and correct them. Value correction is performed
only through coordinated communication during a proce-
dure similar to consensus [1].
The processes are naive: if one of their Boolean values is
considered heads, then the same happens to the other pro-
cesses. The processes are also lazy, meaning that the com-
munication of heads-values has an associated cost, such that
cost(heads)=1 and cost(tails)=0.
Ideally, every process should have its Boolean values always
set to false (tails). For this reason, in general, the pro-
cess avoids initialising their black-boxes with heads values.
Processes are not byzantine, and each time one communi-
cates, it will try, based on the process values, to convince its
partener to either flip or keep one of its values. More specif-
ically, a communication step between two processes x and y
1Similarly, in C++ a private copy constructor and copy as-
signment operator are required for such classes.
is performed in two rounds: firstly, x sends its b value to y
requesting it to update its b value to bx ⊕ by . Afterwards,
process y sends its p value to x asking an update of its v
value to vx ⊕ vy . The ⊕ function models the behaviour of a
coin flip: the coin returns to its initial value after two flips.
During the third communication round the control process
applies the distributed abstract operation e: the update of
the state qy (target) is a function of state qx (control). The
e-operation will not be detailed in the context of the analogy
with distributed systems, and its cost is considered zero.
Besides communicating and performing the distributed op-
eration e, the process can perform local (intra-process) op-
erations that transform the state of the local object q.
5.3 Distributed processing
As previously introduced, inter-process comunication is both
an attempt to correct the black-box values and, at the same
time, a distributed computation. The simplest distributed
system executing a single communication step consists of
two processes, which we will call the control and the tar-
get. The control initiates the communication, thus is the
requester during the first communication round, and the
target is the requester of the second communication round.
Additionally, a process can be both control and target dur-
ing separate communication steps.
Generally, a distributed algorithm represens a series of inter-
process communication steps and local operations. There
are at least two types of algorithms: 1) distributed cor-
rection, where processes communicate only to correct their
Boolean values; 2) distributed computation, in which pro-
cesses try to solve a computational problem. Algorithms
compliant with the first option generally consist only of com-
munication steps and no local operations. A well-defined
correction protocol (see Section 5.5) is the execution of co-
ordinated communication. Distributed computations (the
second option) include intra-process operations but neglect
(do not coordinate) the effect of the two correction rounds in
each communication step. The result is that uncoordinated
correction can lead to propagation of faults: the heads values
are being transferred, without the processes having noticed,
from a faulty process to a correct one (see Section 5.7).
5.4 Fault-tolerant processes
In general, fault-tolerance is achieved by using an hierar-
chic (layered) approach. Assuming the failure probability τ
of a process, a set of two processes will fail simultaneously
with probability τ 2. The introduction of redundancies is the
key of achieving fault-tolerance, and there are two types of
possible redundancies: 1) computational redundancy, where
the same computation is repeated sequentially for multiple
times; 2) resource redundancy, where multiple processes are
abstracted as a single logical process and the component
processes are executed in parallel.
Computational redundancy is the equivalent to executing
a distributed algorithm in epochs, and to guaranteeing that
after a certain number of epochs a property of the algorithm
is achieved. Resource redundancies are generally used when
at least f faulty processes are needed to be tolerated. For
example, the uniform epoch consensus algorithm from [1]
requires N processes with N > 2f .
Majorities (quorums [1]) are the most common option for
checking the introduced redundancies. The simple major-
ity (N/2 + 1) of N objects (processes, bits etc.) is used to
introduce the fault-tolerant quantum computing in the fol-
lowing: a fault-tolerant logical process is constructed from
three (or more) component processes (called components),
and the logical process is able to tolerate at most one faulty
component. The computation of quorums is detailed in Sec-
tion 5.8.
Due to the fact that the q objects of each process are non-
copyable increases the difficulty of implementing fault-tolerance
through redundancy. Copying the q state of an existing
process to a newly initialised one is not possible. As a re-
sult, separate components are initialised into the same state
q ∈ S at the start of the distributed algorithm and exactly
the same operations are applied on their objects.
This work presents, without loss of generality, how the con-
struction of logical processes is performed using triple-modular
redundancy (TMR) [6]. The logical state ql of a logical pro-
cess is a sequence of n (in this work n = 3) component
process states: ql =
∏n
i=0
qi. Transforming ql represents the
transformation of each qi.
The repetition code is the TMR counterpart in the field of
error-checking and -correction methods. As a consequence,
the logical state ql should be interpreted as the encoding
of one of the component process states (the states of the
components are equivalent). The repetition code can be
replaced with more powerful codes like the Hamming code
or surface codes [5], but this aspect is not further addressed
in this work.
After constructing a logical process from three freshly ini-
tialised processes, it is possible to compute the simple ma-
jority of the b-values from every component’s black-box.
Additionaly, after grouping three separate logical processes
(lower-level) into another logical process (higher-level), it
is also possible to keep track of p-value majorities. Corre-
spondingly, the highest-level logical process consists of nine
components (lowest-level) grouped into three logical pro-
cesses. There will be three b-value majorities and one p-
value majority. This hierarchic construction where logical
constructs are embedded into one another is known as con-
catenation, and has the advantage of polynomially lowering
the failure probability of the resulting logical processes [8].
5.5 Fault detectors
The fault detectors used in the described distributed system
are detecting faulty component processes. For each logical
process there is a separate associated fault detector that in-
teracts with the components. A fault detector consists of
a set of low-level processes (called ancillae) which are ini-
tialised, used for communicating with the component pro-
cesses and terminated. The output state of the ancillae is
used to compute a syndrome: infer which component pro-
cess is faulty. A fault detector contains also two variables:
the Boolean faulty indicates if the associated logical process
is faulty or not, and the integer pos points to the faulty
component.
Fault detectors can check either b-values (the components
are controls and the ancillae targets) or p-values (the other
way around, the components are targets and the ancillae
controls). Once more, without loss of generality, the follow-
ing fault detectors will be responsible only for b-values.
Ancillae are usual processes and can be affected by faults,
which are required not to propagate to the components. At
the same time, as process failures are probabilistic, a set of
ancillae is used by the detector for reaching (with high prob-
ability) a trustful decision about the logical process (see Sec-
tion 5.8). A b-value detector responsible for a logical process
protected against b-value faults has the process components
as controls and the ancilla as target during the communica-
tion steps. If the ancilla holds a p-value set to heads, this will
propagate to the components, but it would not influence the
b-value protection. Again, if the ancilla holds a b-value fault,
this will not propagate given the communication protocol.
A logical process could be faulty beyond correction when
a majority of the components is faulty. Assuming that all
the communication between the logical processes is transver-
sal (see Section 5.7), and because process faults are uncor-
related, it would be improbable that such processes exist.
Their existence would be a result of a high τ (called in the
quantum computing literature the error threshold), but can
be mitigated by using more powerful encodings (e.g. sur-
face code). Therefore, it is further assumed that the right
encoding was chosen for the logical process states, and that
faulty components form a minority.
Computing a simple majority of correct processes from a set
of components is equivalent to finding the faulty components
forming a minority. For the distributed system example, a
minority consists of at most one component. Two ancillae
are required, the first one compares the b-values between the
first and the second components, and the second ancilla the
b-values between the second and the third components.
The two ancillae are initialised in the same known state qa.
Let the component b-values be b0, b1, b2; the ancilla output
states after termination will be qa1 = qa+(ba1⊕b0⊕b1)+pa1,
qa2 = qa + (ba2 ⊕ b1 ⊕ b2) + pa2. Considering that initially
the ancillae are not faulty, the fault detector will extract two
bits of information s1 = b0 ⊕ b1 and s2 = b1 ⊕ b2, indicating
how the b-values compare pairwise between the components.
The extension to faulty ancillae is presented in Section 5.8.
The syndrome bits s1 and s2 encode the index of the faulty
component process. For s1 = s2 = 0 no faulty component
exists, and the fault detector sets its faulty flag to false. For
all the other syndrome values, the detector sets faulty=true,
and the faulty component index is computed by pos = s2 ∗
2 + s1 − 1.
5.6 Fault corrector
The fault corrector communicates with all the fault dectors
in the system, and has a global overview of all the faults
that were detected during the execution of the distributed
computation. The global perspective has the following ad-
vantage: the corrector can observe if the modelled τ failure
rates are valid or not; is the modelled failure rate to low?
In the presence of faults (signalled by the detectors), the
fault corrector has two options: to either correct the faults,
or to try and track their effect throught the distributed al-
gorithm. The direct correction could introduce failures, and
for this reason fault-tracking is more advantageous. Fault-
tracking is performed based on commutativity properties:
it is known how faults are transformed by both local and
global operations. Hence, corrections are required only after
the distributed computation was terminated and the output
states were read out from the distributed system.
5.7 Transversality
The transversal application of a logical operation (local or
distributed) is its decomposition into (local or distributed)
operations applied on the component processes. For exam-
ple, the logical local operation Gl is the n-fold application
of G on each of the n components.
Faults are propagated by inter-process communication. In
this section, propagation is illustrated by a distributed sys-
tem with two logical processes, each constructed from three
component processes. Propagation will be mitigated by
transversal communication.
Let qcl be the logical state of the logical control, and q
t
l the
state of the logical target. It is further assumed that in both
logical processes (control and target) at most one component
has its b-value set to heads. Once more, it should be noted
that the processes are not aware of their values. The logical
states were transformed by transversal logical operations re-
sulting in three equivalent component states in each logical
process: qc0 = q
c
1 = q
c
2 and q
t
0 = q
t
1 = q
t
2.
As the component states in both control and target are
equivalent, transversal inter-process communication is im-
plemented by forming pairs between control and target com-
ponents. There are two possibilities: 1) the same control
component is paired with each target component (see Fig-
ure ??); 2) each control component is paired with a different
target component (see Figure ??). The second scenario cor-
responds to transversal inter-process communication.
For the first scenario, assuming that the component process
0c (the component indexed 0 in control) is used, pairs of the
following form (control, target) are built: (0c, 0t), (0c, 1c)
and (0c, 2t). The three communication steps result in the up-
dated b-values of the target components (bit = bit⊕b0c ). As-
suming b0c is heads, the control fault was propagated to the
target components. At this point it cannot be guaranteed
that the logical target is protected against a component’s
single heads b-value. Furthermore, the total cost of commu-
nication between the logical process is c1 = 3× cost(heads).
The second scenario, the transversal inter-process communi-
cation, could result in the following three pairs being formed:
(0c, 0t), (1c, 1t), (2c, 2t). Maintaining the assumption of the
component 0c being faulty in the b-value, after the three
communication rounds only the state of 0t would be nega-
tively affected (b0t = b0t ⊕ b0c ). As a result, after executing
this communication scenario, it can be guaranteed that the
logical target is further protected against a single heads value
of b. The total cost of communication between the logical
process is c2 ≤ 1×cost(heads). Transversality minimises the
communication cost between the logical processes, because
c1 ≥ c2.
5.8 Computational redundancy
Transversality is the key to constructing fault tolerant op-
erations on logical processes, but is not applicable for main-
taining a consistent set of component processes. A different
technique has to be devised. In the presentation of the pro-
cess model it was mentioned that faults can occur any time:
the black-box coin is tossed at random time points. The
toss could happen before each local or distributed opera-
tion. Faults are also allowed to occur before a process is
terminated: after the last operation, but before returning
its final state.
The solution is to continously check and correct every logical
process in the system. Checking is performed by the fault
detectors and corrections are applied by the fault corrector.
A detection round consists of multiple epochs, but a logical
process is continously checked (multiple rounds).
Section 5.5 introduced the fault detector and its use of an-
cillae, but ancillae were considered correct. In the presence
of faults, the syndrome bits could be incorrect and trig-
ger an unnecessary correction that would introduce more
faults. The solution is to repeat during a detection round
the syndrome extraction procedure multiple times, similar
to a sequence of epochs (an example of computational re-
dundancy). Every epoch requires a new pair of ancillae,
and the fault detector will perform majority voting between
the three pairs of extracted syndrome bits.
A freshly initialised process that was detected as being faulty
could be either corrected or directly terminated and a new
process instance would need to be initialised. During the
execution of a process (between local and distributed oper-
ations), correction is the only option. Process operations
could be delayed by the complete detection and correction
procedures, because the detectors requires multiple execu-
tions in order to achieve a probabilistically consistent de-
cision. Thus, fault-tolerance introduces significant resource
and computational overheads.
6. CONCLUSIONS
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